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ABSTRACT 
With globalization, securities markets have become increasingly interconnected, and 
securities fraud has frequently crossed borders, creating problems for national 
regulators seeking to deter and punish fraud.  The United States’ well-developed 
private enforcement mechanism for securities fraud is very attractive to investors 
around the world who are harmed by transnational securities fraud, particularly 
those from countries where private enforcement mechanisms do not exist or fraud is 
under-regulated. The application of U.S. securities law to foreign investors, 
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however, presents a number of challenges, creating the potential for both under and 
overregulation as well as possible conflict with the regulatory systems of other 
jurisdictions.  This Article outlines the current law on extraterritorial application of 
the securities antifraud rules, including a number of important recent developments 
in the case law. It examines the challenges presented by the increasing globalization 
of financial markets, and provides a fresh perspective in the debate on the proper 
scope of the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law. Ultimately, this aticle 
argues against further judicial limitations on the extraterritorial application of the 
securities laws, but urges the development of a multilateral agreement to address the 
numerous and significant challenges presented by transnational securities fraud.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With globalization, securities markets have become progressively more 
interconnected, and securities fraud has increasingly crossed borders, creating 
problems for national regulators seeking to deter and punish fraud.  The United 
States’ well-developed private enforcement mechanism for securities fraud is very 
attractive to investors around the world who are harmed by transnational securities 
fraud, particularly those from countries where private enforcement mechanisms do 
not exist or fraud is under-regulated.1  The application of U.S. securities law to 
foreign investors, however, challenges traditional presumptions against 
extraterritorial application of the law.  Furthermore, broad extraterritorial assertions 
of U.S. antifraud rules can have a negative effect on business interests, and can lead 
to jurisdictional conflict with other countries.2  Courts hearing claims brought by 
foreign investors under U.S. antifraud rules must balance these considerations 
against the aims of deterring securities fraud and protecting U.S. markets and 
investors.  Given the competing normative concerns and the increasingly complex 
fact patterns in transnational securities fraud cases, courts have struggled to delineate 
the proper scope of the extraterritorial application of the U.S. antifraud rules. 
Recent events have shown that, if anything, more rather than less regulation of 
securities fraud is necessary.  The private enforcement mechanism provided for by 
the securities antifraud rules is an important tool in deterring and punishing 
transnational securities fraud that has some connection to the United States. This 
aticle will argue in favor of a flexible approach to determining the extraterritorial 
application of the securities antifraud rules.  However, recognizing the valid 
concerns regarding jurisdictional conflict and comity considerations raised by a 
broad extraterritorial assertion of U.S. regulatory law in this area, this Article urges 
countries to seek a multilateral solution to the problems raised by transnational 
securities fraud.   
                                                                 
 1 While the regulatory systems of most countries with a developed securities market 
include proscriptions against fraud, there are broad variations in the intensity and methods of 
enforcement from one country to another.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The 
Impact of Enforcement 4 (Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, 
Working Paper No. 304, 2007); Howell E. Jackson, Variations in the Intensity of Financial 
regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. REG. 253, 256 
(2007). 
 2 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: 
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 63-64 (2007). 
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In supporting this position, Part I of this Article will provide background on U.S. 
securities antifraud rules and the global economy, emphasizing the challenge of 
addressing transnational securities fraud with primarily local regulatory tools.  Part II 
will then set forth the current state of the law regarding the extraterritorial 
application of the U.S. securities antifraud provisions.  Part III will examine the 
Second Circuit’s recent application of the “conduct” test in the noteworthy case of 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank.3  It will also point out the problems with the 
current approach of courts in determining the extraterritorial reach of the securities 
antifraud rules in the context of so called foreign-cubed cases such as Morrison.  Part 
IV will address possible solutions to these problems. This Article will then conclude 
by arguing for a multilateral framework that would enhance cooperation and 
establish minimum standards for regulating securities fraud, as well as a 
jurisdictional or choice-of-law rule to avoid jurisdictional conflict and unnecessary 
overregulation.   
II.  THE SECURITIES ANTIFRAUD RULES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
Federal regulation of securities transactions emerged in the aftermath of the 1929 
stock market crash, with the aims of promoting “full and fair disclosure” in the sale 
of securities, protecting investors against fraud, and maintaining “fair and honest 
markets” for securities transactions.4  The securities laws achieve these goals through 
the implementation of a mandatory full disclosure policy under which market 
participants are required to reveal certain material information in connection with 
offers, sales, and purchases of securities, through proscriptions against fraud, and 
through the imposition of civil liabilities for violations of the securities laws and 
rules.5   
Of course, much has changed in the American and global financial markets since 
the 1930s.  Companies and investors alike participate in markets outside their own 
home base to an extent probably undreamed of at the time these U.S. securities laws 
were written.  And yet, financial regulation remains largely bound by national 
borders, though cooperation between regulators has increased.6  At the same time, 
however, fraud in the financial markets is not constricted by national boundaries, as 
the recent unmasking of several global financial scandals has shown.7  In addition, 
though most developed countries prohibit securities fraud in similar substantive 
                                                                 
 3 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 4 See 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2010); see also Michael J. Calhoun, 
Tension on the High Seas of Transnational Securities Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United 
States Jurisdiction, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 679, 682 (1999). 
 5 See Calhoun, supra note 4, at 683. 
 6 See, e.g., Catrin Griffiths, SEC Beefs Up Cross-Border Cooperation in Blitz on Fraud, 
THE LAWYER, Sept. 21, 2009, http://www.thelawyer.com/sec-beefs-up-cross-border-
cooperation-in-blitz-on-fraud/1002023.article. 
 7 See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS., STRENGTHENING CAPITAL 
MARKETS AGAINST FINANCIAL FRAUD iii (2005), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ 
IOSCOPD192.pdf (hereinafter IOSCO, Financial Fraud). 
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terms,8 significant differences exist in the manner such rules are enforced and the 
remedies that are available.9  The United States, in particular, is viewed as having 
one of the broadest prohibitions on securities fraud, in addition to having a relatively 
accessible mechanism for private enforcement.10  For this reason, foreign investors 
are increasingly seeking to initiate lawsuits in U.S. courts against alleged violators of 
U.S. antifraud rules.11  
A.  Rule 10b-5: The Catch-All Antifraud Provision 
One reason for the popularity of the U.S. antifraud regime among litigants is the 
breadth of its most important antifraud provision, Rule 10b-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).12  This securities regulatory regime 
seeks to prevent and punish fraud via numerous provisions in both the Securities Act 
of 193313 and the Exchange Act.  However, the most far-reaching of these provisions 
is Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and its accompanying Rule 10b-5.  The 
Supreme Court has characterized Section 10(b) as a “catch-all” provision.14  It is not 
restricted to fraud in connection with sales or transactions in the United States, but 
rather applies to the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national 
securities exchange or any security not so registered,” so long as the means of 
interstate commerce are implicated.15  Courts, in interpreting the language and 
legislative history of Section 10(b), have determined that “Congress thus meant § 
10(b) to protect against fraud in the sale or purchase of securities whether or not 
these were traded on organized United States markets.”16   
In 1942, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) used its rule-making 
authority under Section 10(b) to promulgate Rule 10b-5.  Rule 10b-5 makes it 
unlawful: 
                                                                 
 8 Compare, for example, the prohibition in Rule 10b-5 to Trade Practices Act, 1974, c. 52 
(Austl.) (prohibiting a corporation from engaging in conduct in trade or commerce that “is 
misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive”). 
 9 See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Competition in the Private Enforcement of Regulatory 
Law 2 (Indiana University School of Law – Bloomington Working Paper Series, 2008) 
(available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129832) (hereinafter Buxbaum, Competition). 
10 See id. at 1;  see also Joshua G. Urquhart, Transnational Securities Fraud Regulation: 
Problems and Solutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 473 (2000) (characterizing the US system as 
the most “plaintiff-friendly”). 
11 Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 16-17. 
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(1951). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1934). 
14 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976). 
15 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010) (emphasis added). 
16 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange,  
a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,  
b. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or  
c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.17   
 
The language of the rule is not only unquestionably far reaching, but also vague.  
The details of its application and scope were left almost exclusively for the courts to 
determine, generating extensive judicial discussion.18  With the increasing integration 
of the world financial markets, one of the key questions with regards to Rule 10b-5, 
in judicial, academic, and practitioner circles, has been the scope of its 
extraterritorial application.  The debate centers on the issue of how to properly 
delineate this scope so as to prevent and punish fraud, without discouraging 
companies from transacting in the United States or with U.S. persons, and without 
causing conflict with other nations’ interests in regulating the activity. 
B.  Lawsuits Under the Antifraud Rules and “Foreign-Cubed” Cases 
Rule 10b-5 has no explicit civil remedy for its violation, but an implied private 
right of action has been well established for some time.19  In affirming the finding of 
an implied private right of action under 10b-5, the Supreme Court has noted that 
“private enforcement of Commission rules may ‘[provide] a necessary supplement to 
Commission action’”20 in carrying out the purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  
Commentators have affirmed this position, noting that a private enforcement 
mechanism provides a strong form of ex-post regulation that allows relatively lax ex-
ante regulation, a central characteristic of the U.S. securities regulatory system.21  
The class action mechanism for lawsuits further strengthens the deterrent effect of 
the private enforcement regime, combating the collective action problem presented 
                                                                 
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
18 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 3477 (3rd ed. 2003) 
(noting that “it is difficult to think of another instance in the entire corpus juris in which the 
interaction of the legislative, administrative rulemaking, and judicial processes has produced 
so much from so little,” and quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist who has called 10b-5 a “judicial 
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”). 
19 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196.  It is also by now a common occurrence for class action 
lawsuits to be brought under Rule 10b-5, and the SEC may also bring suit against violators for 
the imposition of fines and/or injunctions. 
20 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (quoting J. I. Case 
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).  
21 Samuel Isaacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 380-82 (2007). 
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by securities fraud perpetrated on widely dispersed shareholders.22  In contrast, 
private litigation of securities fraud is less common in other countries, which rely 
more heavily on government regulators to enforce their securities laws.  However, 
securities fraud litigation is catching on in other places, including Australia, Europe, 
and China.23   
In the context of globalized financial markets, securities fraud litigation in U.S. 
courts raises complex questions about the extraterritorial application of securities 
laws.  It is very rare to find a modern securities fraud case that does not have an 
international facet of some kind, be it a case against a foreign issuer whose shares are 
traded on an American exchange,24 a suit against an American company who sells its 
shares both in the United States and abroad,25 or a suit against a foreign company 
who orchestrates a fraud in the United States, for example via its American 
subsidiary.26 One particular genre of cases that has been presented with increasing 
frequency is the so-called “foreign-cubed” cases.27  These cases involve (1) a foreign 
investor who purchased the securities (2) of a foreign corporation (3) in a foreign 
transaction.28  At first blush, these cases are predicated on transactions having little to 
do with the United States, and it seems hardly surprising that courts would decline to 
apply U.S. law to them.  Certainly, they do present the outermost limit of the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws.  However, courts have recognized 
that there are some instances in which these cases should be heard in the United 
States, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part III, infra. 
Evidence suggests that cases implicating the extraterritoriality of U.S. securities 
laws are becoming increasingly common.29  A study of securities fraud class actions 
                                                                 
22 Ilana T. Buschkin, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy – 
Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal 
Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1564-65 (2005). 
23 See, e.g., Olivier Cavézian, et. al., Class Actions in Europe: Reality or Myth? The 
Example of France, JONES DAY (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.jonesday.com/ 
files/Publication/ff7fd833-8640-443cbb46d6e756864345/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
6e60f00f-0d2a-4c0c-b986-d7982522c1f6/Class%20Actions%202009.pdf; Jonathan Redwood, 
Limitations of U.S. Securities Litigation Against Australian Companies by Australian 
Plaintiffs, LIST A BARRISTER PUBLICATIONS (Dec. 2008), available at http://www. 
barristers.com.au/www/392/1001127/displayarticle/recent-publications1001461.html; Chao 
Xi, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: Daqing Lianyi Co v. Zhong Weida and 
Others (2004) Heilongjiang High Court, 1 J. COMP. L. 492 (2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965635. 
24 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). 
25 See Mohanty v. Bigband Networks, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P94, 581 (2008). 
26 See In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
27 Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 17. 
28 See Stuart M. Grant & Diane Zilka, The Current Role of Foreign Investors in Federal 
Securities Class Actions, 1620 PLI/CORP. 11 (2007). Grant and Zilka are generally credited 
with coining the term “foreign-cubed.” 
29 See, e.g., Brief of the Securities Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, in Response 
to the Court’s Request at 4-5, Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(No. 07-0583-CV) (hereinafter SEC Brief). 
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found that they have generally been on the rise in recent years, particularly as a by-
product of the sub-prime crisis and the global financial crisis, with actions against 
foreign issuers hitting an all-time high in 2008.30 This provides both a challenge and 
an opportunity for examination of the still unsettled law on the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. securities laws. 
III.  EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES ANTIFRAUD RULES 
The Exchange Act is generally silent as to the extraterritorial application of its 
antifraud provisions, except that Section 10(b) limits its reach to prohibited actions 
using the “means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails.”31  Given 
modern technology and the global nature of financial markets, this provision could 
technically encompass a broad range of transactions having little or nothing to do 
with the United States.  However, the breadth of the antifraud provision is tempered 
by a general presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law32 and 
principles of international comity.  Though it is clear that Congress, in its broad 
wording of the antifraud provisions, intended some form of extraterritorial 
application, it has left the task of outlining the scope of their extraterritorial 
application to the courts.   
A.  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
Historically, application of regulatory laws was limited by the principle of 
territoriality, as articulated in the Supreme Court’s famous American Banana case.33 
However, the extraterritorial application of regulatory laws is now widely accepted, 
though there remains a debate as to the proper scope and justifications for such 
application.34 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, drawing on 
principles of customary international law, provides some guidance as to the proper 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. regulatory law.  It defines jurisdiction to prescribe as the 
power of a country to “make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of 
persons, or the interests of persons in things.”35  The Restatement goes on to set forth 
the following bases of jurisdiction: conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes 
place within its territory; and conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to 
                                                                 
30 See, e.g., Grace Lamont & Patricia A. Etzold, 2008 Securities Litigation Study, 
PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS Apr. 1, 2009, http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20 
SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL.PDF.  It is important to note that class actions 
are treated differently than other private actions or SEC enforcement actions in regard to the 
question of the extraterritorial application of the securities laws.   
31 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2010). 
32  Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 
(1991). “It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a 
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.’” (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949)). 
33 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
34 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883 
(2002) (hereinafter Guzman, New Foundations). 
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1987) (hereinafter 
Restatement 3rd). 
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have substantial effect within its territory.36  These two bases of jurisdiction are 
reflected in the court-developed approaches known as the “conduct” and “effects” 
tests, discussed below.   
Even when one of the aforementioned bases for jurisdiction is minimally present, 
the Restatement requires that the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.37  
Drawing on the interest balancing approach of modern choice-of-law analysis, it sets 
forth certain factors that should inform the reasonableness inquiry, such as the 
relative interests of the States whose regulatory regimes are implicated, overall 
contacts with the country seeking to exercise jurisdiction, and reasonable 
expectations of the parties.38  
With respect to U.S. securities laws in particular, the Restatement has more to 
say, asserting that jurisdiction exists with regards to “conduct occurring 
predominantly in the United States that is related to a transaction in securities, even 
if the transaction takes place outside the United States.”39  This is a fairly broad 
assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe, reflecting the policy articulated in the 
Restatement that “an interest in punishing fraudulent or manipulative conduct is 
entitled to greater weight than are routine administrative requirements.”40  However, 
the extent of jurisdiction to prescribe under the Restatement is considered the outer 
limit of the legislature’s extraterritorial reach, and courts have generally declined to 
interpret Congress’ intent as having reached those outer limits in the context of U.S. 
securities antifraud rules.41 
The Restatement, like the judicially-developed “conduct” and “effects” tests, 
reflects the need to balance a state’s regulatory interest against considerations of 
international comity as well as an interest in preserving limited judicial resources.42  
Principles of comity dictate that courts consider whether an exercise of U.S. 
jurisdiction in a particular case will conflict with or infringe upon the regulatory 
interests of another nation.43  Further, case law has recognized that, though a 
                                                                 
36 Id.       
37 Id. § 403. 
38 Id. § 403(2)(a)-(h);  see also, Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational 
Litigation and Global Securities Class Actions Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 477 (2009). 
39 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 416(1)(d) (1987).  
40 Id. § 416 cmt. a (1987). 
41 Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334.   
42 The policies of avoiding jurisdictional conflict and preserving U.S. judicial resources 
have been articulated frequently by the courts in cases addressing extraterritorial application of 
the securities laws. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).  
However, it is worth noting that these considerations are also addressed by other tools of the 
courts besides jurisdictional inquiries, such as discretionary dismissals on the bases of forum 
non conveniens and comity.  Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 64-65. 
43 The Supreme Court has articulated comity as “neither a matter of absolute obligation, on 
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition 
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights 
of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v. 
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). 
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regulatory interest may exist, if a transaction is “predominantly foreign,” the court 
“must seek to determine whether Congress would have wished the precious 
resources of the United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to 
them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries.”44  These considerations 
must be taken into account when courts consider whether an alleged fraud bears a 
sufficient connection to the United States to warrant application of U.S. antifraud 
rules.   
B.  The Conduct and Effects Tests 
Because of its location at the center of the financial markets, the Second Circuit 
has been the most influential court in terms of the development of jurisprudence in 
this area.  Though, other courts have sometimes deviated from the Second Circuit’s 
approach.45  The Second Circuit has developed two tests to determine whether U.S. 
securities laws should apply extraterritorially: the conduct test and the effects test.  
Application of the antifraud rules may be found on the basis of either test, or on an 
admixture of the two.46  The effects test focuses on whether U.S. investors or markets 
were harmed by the alleged fraud.  This will typically be the case, for example, 
where a foreign company’s stock trades on a U.S. market.47  The key limitation to the 
effects test is that courts do not consider foreign conduct with only generalized 
effects in the United States to be sufficient.48  Rather, courts require a showing of 
harm to specific interests within the United States.49   
The conduct test looks at whether some conduct that was material to the alleged 
fraud directly caused the harm in question, regardless of the location of the investors 
or the markets where the stock was sold.50  The conduct test, while more soundly 
rooted in the traditional basis of territoriality than the effects test, has proven to be 
more difficult to apply than the effects test.  The main difficulty is determining what 
level of conduct in the U.S. is sufficient to warrant jurisdiction under the Exchange 
Act.  Securities transactions can be made up of many moving parts that often cross 
territorial boundaries and fraudulent acts can occur in more than one place.51  The 
Second Circuit addressed this question in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., asserting 
                                                                 
44 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985. 
45 See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also 
Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Law: An 
Inquiry into the Utility of a “Choice-of-Law” Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1812 (1992). 
46 Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1995). 
47 This was so in the first case to articulate the effects test.  Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). 
48 Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 22. 
49 See id. at 22-3 (citing Interbrew S.A. v. Edperbrascan Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998)). 
50 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993 (asserting that U.S. securities laws apply to losses from sales of 
securities to foreigners outside the United States only when acts or culpable failures to act 
within the United States directly caused such losses). 
51 See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of 
American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 216-17 (1996). 
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that U.S. securities laws only apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners 
outside the United States when acts or culpable failures to act directly caused such 
losses.52  Lesser thresholds of conduct are necessary when conduct causes losses in 
the United States (no U.S. conduct is necessary), or to Americans residents abroad 
(acts or omissions in the United States must have “significantly contributed” to such 
losses).53  The Bersch standard relating to conduct causing losses to foreigners has 
been further refined to hold that subject matter jurisdiction exists over securities 
claims if “activities in [the United States] were more than merely preparatory to a 
fraud and culpable acts or omissions occurring here directly caused losses to 
investors abroad.”54  Of course, this still begs the questions of what is “merely 
preparatory” and what constitutes “directly caused”; lower courts have struggled 
with these questions, and the Second Circuit itself has provided little guidance.   
C.  A Procedural Note 
Courts have always treated the question of extraterritorial application of the 
securities antifraud provisions as a question of subject matter jurisdiction.55  
However, this is somewhat of a misnomer as the real question is one of jurisdiction 
to prescribe,56 or rather, whether or not the allegedly fraudulent acts fall within the 
ambit of U.S. securities antifraud rules.57  The Supreme Court recently criticized the 
“less-than-meticulous” treatment by courts of the distinction between an element of a 
claim for relief under federal law and a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction.58  To 
remedy this, the Supreme Court in Arbaugh v. T & H Corp.59 drew a bright-line rule 
holding that “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as 
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”60  
Even though the controversy before the Supreme Court was a Title VII claim, the 
Court did not reserve its new bright-line rule to a particular context.  Further, lower 
courts have acknowledged that the rule from Arbaugh is applicable in the context of 
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws.61   
The jurisdictional limitation articulated by courts in these cases reflected a 
“recognition by the courts that Congress would not have wished ‘the precious 
resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies’ to be spent on 
                                                                 
52  Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993. 
53 Id. 
54 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). 
55 See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 984-90. 
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 
(1987) (defining jurisdiction to prescribe as the power of a country to “make its law applicable 
to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things”). 
57 See also ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION & ARBITRATION 55 (3rd ed. 
2005). 
58 Arbaugh v. T & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006). 
59 Id. at 500. 
60 Id. at 516.   
61 See In re Parmalat Securities Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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predominantly foreign transactions.”62  While the recognition is valid, the question is 
not one of subject matter jurisdiction of the courts.  Instead, the Court’s statement in 
Arbaugh clarifies that the inquiry should be one of a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief 
under relevant provisions of the Exchange Act.  Jurisdiction over lawsuits alleging 
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is conferred by Section 27 of the 
Exchange Act.63  The location of fraudulent conduct, therefore, does not affect this 
conferral of jurisdiction.  It is only relevant as to whether or not a particular 
fraudulent scheme or act violates Section 10(b).  Section 10(b) does not apply if no 
use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce was made.64  Further, 
courts have long recognized that the federal securities laws do not reach the outer 
limit of Congress’ power to impose civil liabilities (which is constrained only by 
constitutional due process considerations).65  Therefore, a fraudulent scheme must 
have sufficient connection to the United States in order to be covered by the 
substantive prohibitions of Section 10(b).66   
There is an additional way in which the location of fraudulent acts in connection 
with the sale or purchase of securities can be relevant.  The private right of action for 
Section 10(b) requires that a claim by a private plaintiff, as opposed to a suit brought 
by the SEC, must allege a causal connection between their injury and the plaintiff’s 
conduct.67  Therefore, where application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to a 
particular fraudulent scheme is predicated solely on conduct within the United 
States, foreign private plaintiffs could be required to show a causal connection 
between the U.S. conduct and their alleged injuries.68  Such an approach would be in 
keeping with the Supreme Court’s approach to the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
antitrust laws.69  While making the distinction between a jurisdictional inquiry and a 
failure-to-state-a-claim inquiry may have minimal impact on the outcome of most 
cases, it does make clear the distinction between the standard that must be met by 
private plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit versus the standard that must be met by the 
SEC in an enforcement action.70  In cases involving parallel claims by foreign private 
litigants and the SEC, this distinction is important, as courts using the subject matter 
                                                                 
62 Id. (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
63 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2009). 
64 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2009); see also supra text accompanying notes 13-15. 
65 See Leasco, 468 F.2d 1334. 
66 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11-12, 
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 129 S.Ct. 2762 (2009) (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL 719337 
[hereinafter Brief of Solicitor General]. 
67 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). 
68 Brief of Solicitor General, supra note 66, at 10-11. 
69 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
70 Courts have recognized that a stricter standard is appropriate for extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law in the context of class actions.  See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 
519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that “Congress did not mean the United States to be 
used as a base for fraudulent securities schemes even when the victims are foreigners, at least 
in the context of suits by the SEC or by named foreign plaintiffs” (emphasis added)). 
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jurisdiction inquiry have historically dismissed both actions if they find an 
insufficient connection between the U.S. conduct and the alleged harm.71  
IV.  THE CONDUCT TEST IN FOCUS: FOREIGN-CUBED CASES AND THE PROBLEMS OF 
UNDER AND OVERREGULATION 
The conduct test has been applied frequently in recent years.  With the increasing 
incidence of transnational securities fraud, investors have become more proactive in 
seeking redress.  Often this leads them to the United States, with its well-developed 
class action mechanism in securities fraud cases.72   Courts have begun to hear so-
called foreign-cubed cases with increasing frequency.73  Such cases test the outer 
limits of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud rules on the basis of the 
conduct test, and also highlight the problems with the current approach of courts 
with respect to this issue. 
A.  Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
A recent foreign-cubed case decided by the Second Circuit underscored the 
particular difficulties raised by this kind of case and reignited debate on the proper 
scope of the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws on the basis of conduct.  The 
impetus for Morrison v. National Australia Bank was a series of write-downs made 
by National Australia Bank (“NAB”) in 2001, due to the allegedly fraudulent 
overvaluation of one of NAB’s American subsidiaries, HomeSide, Inc., a Florida-
based mortgage servicing company.74  The write-downs totaled approximately $4 
billion.75  It constituted the largest loss reported in Australian corporate history up to 
that point.76  NAB’s shares, trading on the Australian Stock Exchange, as well as on 
exchanges in Tokyo, New Zealand, London, and in the form of American Depositary 
Receipts (“ADRs”) on the New York Stock Exchange, initially dropped between 
10% and 13% following the write-downs.77 
In response to these losses, a group of international shareholders of the bank 
brought a lawsuit against NAB in U.S. federal court, claiming violations of the 
securities antifraud rules including Rule 10b-5. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
                                                                 
71 See generally, e.g., Morrison, 547 F.3d 167. 
72 See PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2008 Securities Litigation Study, April 1, 2009, 
http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL 
.PDF (noting that securities class actions against foreign issuers hit an all-time high in 2008). 
73 Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 17. 
74 Morrison, 547 F.3d 167. 
75 “A$” denotes Australian dollars.  According to statistics of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, the Australian dollar was worth approximately 0.53 US dollars on the date of 
NAB’s announcement of its second HomeSide-related write-down. 
76 Shann Turnbull, Men Behaving Badly in Banking: Revealing the Irrelevance of Best 
Practices in Corporate Governance, in GOVERNANCE, RISK AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK: 
TECHNOLOGY, FINANCE, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE AND BEST PRACTICES 82, 
83 (Anthony G. Tarantino ed., 2008), available at http://media.wiley.com/product_ancillary/ 
9X/04700958/DOWNLOAD/chapter73.pdf. 
77 Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 19, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (No. 07-0583-CV) [hereinafter Appellants’ Brief]. 
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overvaluation of HomeSide was the result of intentional misuse of valuation models 
by certain NAB employees and executives who “had been cooking HomeSide’s 
books since at least April 1999,” in violation of the U.S. securities laws.78  These 
misstatements of HomeSide’s value were sent to NAB’s headquarters in Australia 
and incorporated into its consolidated financial statements, then disseminated to the 
public in regulatory filings and press releases, including filings with the SEC made 
in connection with NAB’s ADRs.79 
Although calling the case a “close call,” the District Court dismissed the case, 
stating that “the transactions of which the plaintiffs complain [are] fundamentally 
foreign in nature, and thus beyond the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction under the 
Exchange Act.”80  On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
outcome.81  However, the Second Circuit left open the possibility that, on other facts, 
it would hear a foreign-cubed claim by foreign plaintiffs.82  Defendants had argued 
for a bright-line rule barring foreign-cubed claims brought solely on the basis of 
conduct in the United States, if there was no allegation of harm to domestic investors 
or markets.83  The Second Circuit refused to adopt such a rule, because it could not 
anticipate “all the circumstances in which the ingenuity of those inclined to violate 
the securities laws should result in their being subject to American jurisdiction.”84  
Instead, the Second Circuit determined that the conduct and effects tests were the 
proper lens through which to examine the question of extraterritoriality.85  It went on 
to say that the issue before it in Morrison “boils down to what conduct comprises the 
heart of the alleged fraud.”86  On the facts of the case, though, the Second Circuit 
found that acts or omissions in Australia were “more directly responsible” for the 
plaintiffs’ injuries, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case.87   
Morrison was the Second Circuit’s first look at a foreign-cubed case, and 
although it did not find a sufficient basis for the application of U.S. securities laws, 
numerous district court decisions have come out the other way.  For example, In re 
Gaming Lottery involved claims by both U.S. and foreign plaintiffs against a 
Canadian corporation for fraud in connection with the sale of securities on both 
American and Canadian exchanges.88  The relevant U.S. conduct included the 
acquisition of a Washington corporation which the defendant company proceeded to 
operate without receiving regulatory approval from Washington State gaming 
                                                                 
78 Id. at 25. 
79 Id. 
80  In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94162, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
81 Morrison, 547 F.3d 167. 
82 Id. at 175. 
83 Id. at 174. 
84 Id. at 175. 
85 Id. 
86 Morrison, 547 F.3d 175.  
87 Id. at 176. 
88 In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64-68 (1999). 
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regulators for operations.89  In addition, the company reported increases in earnings 
and stockholder equity based on the acquired entity’s financials, even though they 
knew they would not be able to obtain regulatory approval for the entity’s 
operations, therefore making the statements regarding the U.S. subsidiary’s earnings 
misleading.90  The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York certified both Canadians and U.S. investors as lead plaintiffs,91 finding that 
sufficient conduct had occurred in the United States that was “more than merely 
preparatory” to the alleged fraud so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction over the 
claims of both Canadian and domestic plaintiffs.92   
Similarly, in In re Vivendi Universal, the issuing company’s Chief Executive 
Officer (“CEO”) and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) moved to New York in order 
to oversee a number of acquisitions of U.S. companies.  It was debt taken on in 
connection with these acquisitions that was the focus of the allegedly false and 
misleading statements at issue in the lawsuit.93  The U.S.-based conduct was, 
therefore, the basis for the false statements, and was found to be “integral and not 
merely preparatory to the alleged fraud upon foreign purchasers of Vivendi shares on 
foreign exchanges.”94   
Comparing the facts of these cases to Morrison, it seems clear that Morrison 
could have easily come out the other way.95  Indeed, the judge in In re Gaming 
Lottery might well have found for plaintiffs in Morrison.   Although the Second 
Circuit claimed to be applying its “usual rules,”96 the court struggled with the issue 
of whether the conduct in the U.S. had “directly caused” the harm abroad.  The 
Second Circuit used novel language to find that acts or omissions in Australia were 
“more directly responsible” for the plaintiffs’ injuries.97  This simple addition of the 
word “more” had the effect of changing the inquiry to a question of which acts, on 
balance, more directly caused the alleged fraud.  Under the usual articulation of the 
test, it is quite possible that conduct in more than one place could directly cause the 
alleged harm.  Certainly, the Restatement and customary international law both 
contemplate concurrent jurisdiction in some circumstances.98  The Second Circuit’s 
                                                                 
89 Id. at 65-67. 
90 Id. 
91 The process of appointing a lead plaintiff in multinational securities class actions often 
invokes the question of the extraterritorial application of the US antifraud rules.  See 
Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 27-29. 
92 In re Gaming Lottery, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 73-74. 
93 In re Vivendi Universal SA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21230, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
94 Id. at 14. 
95 See Choi & Silberman, supra note 38, at 492 (noting that, “another court, analyzing the 
same facts, may have decided the case differently . . .”).  
96 Morrison, 547 F.3d at 172. 
97 Id. at 176 (emphasis added). 
98 P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterritoriality: Correcting the “Balance of Interests”, 41 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 245, 253 (1992). 
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“more directly” language had never appeared in any prior case, making it seem like 
the Court was straining to avoid exercising jurisdiction in this case.   
Furthermore, the Second Circuit never said that the actions taken in the U.S. were 
not directly responsible for the losses to investors abroad, but only that the actions in 
Australia were a more direct cause, essentially introducing a balancing test into the 
analysis where none had previously existed.  Such a balancing approach is 
reminiscent of the approach taken by the Restatement, even though courts and 
commentators have generally eschewed the utility of a conflict-of-laws style interest-
balancing approach to these cases.99  Furthermore, just because the activity abroad 
may have more directly caused the harm in a particular case, it should not necessarily 
dictate that a U.S. court has no jurisdiction to hear the case.  Such an outcome could 
violate the spirit of U.S. securities laws and could leave defrauded investors without 
a remedy, even in cases where arguably grievous acts of fraud had occurred in the 
United States.  
B.  The Problems of Under and Overregulation 
As the Second Circuit’s decision in Morrison highlights, one of the key problems 
with the conduct test is that it is difficult to apply to modern securities fraud cases.  
Because of the case-by-case nature of the inquiry and the lack of uniformity among 
courts in interpreting the conduct test, cases with similar facts will often have 
disparate outcomes, without any clear indicators from courts as to what tips the 
balance one way or the other.  In fact, rather than seeking to provide a clear set or 
hierarchy of factors, courts have cautioned against relying on any particular factor as 
a sufficient decisional guide.100  One reason for retaining a flexible test and shunning 
bright-line rules is to avoid providing a roadmap to fraud for opportunistic issuers.  
In fact, a concern expressed by the plaintiffs and the SEC as amicus curiae in the 
Morrison case was that the court’s holding could “render superfluous the conduct 
test, in effect converting it into a ‘from where the misstatements originated and 
emanated’ test.”101 Such a standard could make it easier for foreign entities to 
structure transactions specifically to avoid application of the U.S. antifraud rules 
while still benefiting from the fraudulent conduct of their U.S. subsidiaries.102  
Foreign issuers may in fact be doing so already.  A practice note written by an 
Australian law firm following the Morrison decision advises issuer clients that they 
can limit exposure to U.S. litigation by “taking steps to ensure that . . . the issuance 
of [their] disclosures” occurs outside the United States.103   
                                                                 
99 See, e.g., Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32 n.2 (“[B]alancing tests . . . tend to deemphasize 
foreign sovereign interests and almost never lead a court to decline jurisdiction.”); see 
generally, Weintraub, supra note 45, at 1809. 
100 IIT, Int’l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980). 
101 Appellants’ Brief, supra note 77, at 38. 
102 See id. at 38-9 (“[F]oreign entities with U.S. subsidiaries could brazenly turn a blind 
eye to their subsidiaries' misconduct while enjoying immunity from American securities laws - 
regardless of how much misconduct occurred on U.S. soil - provided that the foreign entities 
create and disseminate their financial statements from abroad.”). 
103 Redwood, supra note 23. 
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Apart from providing a roadmap to fraud for opportunistic issuers, too narrow an 
approach to extraterritoriality could result in under regulation, if no country has a 
sufficient basis or motivation for applying their law to a case.  For example, an 
approach such as that used by the Morrison court that would apply U.S. law only 
where U.S. conduct comprises “the heart” of the fraud, could frequently result in 
instances where no law applies, as conduct may not predominate in any single 
jurisdiction.  This kind of anarchy in terms of antifraud enforcement could negatively 
impact investor confidence in the securities markets.   
In a world where fraud is not sufficiently deterred, or where adequate remedies 
are not available to defrauded investors, investor confidence in the integrity of 
securities markets will be compromised.104  This can have a negative effect on 
liquidity and prices in markets around the world.105  Recent decades have seen a 
dramatic increase in the integration and interdependence of world financial markets.  
Generally speaking, globalization along these lines is viewed as a positive thing, 
generating economic growth around the world.  However the “flip side . . . is the 
problem of financial crises—the problem of lending booms and busts, massive 
capital inflows and equally massive reversals.”106  A second aspect of this increasing 
integration of the world’s financial markets is the global nature of modern securities 
fraud.  For example, the revelation of the multi-billion-dollar international ponzi 
scheme run by Bernard Madoff epitomizes the truly global reach of modern 
securities fraud: from his base in New York, Madoff sold his scheme to investors on 
nearly every continent.  Victims ranged from the major Spanish bank Santander to a 
Korean pension fund to a synagogue in New York to the International Olympic 
Committee.107  Fraud such as this can and does negatively impact investor 
confidence, slowing investment flows around the world.108 
All of this complicates the work of financial regulators, who must seek to 
regulate the increasingly complex and integrated securities markets and prevent 
fraud that stretches across borders, without overstepping the traditionally territorial 
mandate of regulatory law, and without over-regulating, which causes costly 
inefficiencies.  In the words of one SEC commissioner:  
Our mission to facilitate capital formation extends not just to companies 
headquartered in the United States, but to those from outside the country 
as well . . . . We must be careful to balance the costs versus benefits of our 
regulations—we must maintain the integrity of our markets so that 
investors have confidence that they will be treated fairly, but we also must 
                                                                 
104 See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Ninth Annual Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture: 
Regulation and Investors’ Trust in the Securities Market, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 439, 443-44 
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not price those very investors out of our markets through burdensome 
regulations.109   
The work of U.S. regulators is further complicated by the fact that the SEC is, in the 
words of one commentator, “overworked and understaffed.”110  Therefore, the SEC is 
not able to proactively regulate corporate behavior so as to deter fraudulent activity, 
and, instead, must rely on private enforcement mechanisms. 
In the aftermath of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the revelation of recent 
securities fraud scandals, a consensus has emerged that the SEC and other regulators 
have failed to properly maintain the balance between the costs and benefits of its 
regulations. The resulting loss of confidence in financial regulators extends 
internationally as well.  In early 2009, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (“UNCTAD”) issued a report on the global economic crisis citing a 
number of “systemic factors” that contributed to the crisis, including “the full-
fledged deregulation of financial markets and the increased sophistication of 
speculation techniques and financial engineering.”111   
On the flip side, an open-ended approach creates uncertainty for issuers regarding 
potential liability under U.S. antifraud rules.  This may have a chilling effect on 
valuable economic activity in the United States, as foreign companies limit their 
business within the United States in order to avoid the risk of having to defend 
against costly litigation in U.S. courts.112  For example, if the Morrison case had 
came out the other way, it could have potentially discourage foreign companies from 
investing in U.S. subsidiaries.  Furthermore, as multiple countries can often claim a 
legitimate regulatory interest in regulating the same conduct, the cost of multiple 
regulations becomes burdensome to businesses.  Concurrent jurisdiction may not 
always be a problem, but when multiple countries are able to assert their regulatory 
jurisdiction over conduct because of effects on their citizens, and one or more other 
countries are also able to apply their laws and regulations because of conduct within 
their borders, the cost of compliance with all these rules can become prohibitive.  For 
example, in a recent alleged fraud by the French media company Vivendi Universal, 
S.A., French regulatory authorities carried out a criminal investigation into the 
scandal.113  At the same time, the company was sued in U.S. federal court under Rule 
                                                                 
109 Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, Securities Exchange Commission, Speech in Paris, 
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110 Buschkin, supra note 22, at 1592. 
111 U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD] Report, Secretariat Task Force on 
Systematic and Economic Cooperation, The Global Economic Crisis: Systematic Failures and 
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112 See generally Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on 
Capital Markets Regulation (2006), available at http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_ 
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156 GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:139 
10b-5 by both European and U.S. investors.  It is also becoming increasingly costly 
for regulators and judicial systems to enforce the law, as more and more transactions 
can implicate a country’s regulatory system on the basis of tenuous contacts with that 
country.114  
In addition to potential over-regulation, too broad of an extraterritorial 
application of the U.S. antifraud rules could result in jurisdictional conflict with 
other countries seeking to regulate the same transaction.  Because of variations in the 
intensity of enforcement and the remedies available, investors may forum-shop to 
find the most favorable forum in which to bring their suit.115  Countries that have 
made the regulatory judgment to provide less investor protection could, therefore, 
have their legislative judgment thwarted.116  In other contexts, such as antitrust, broad 
assertions of extraterritorial application of U.S. laws has raised diplomatic protests.117  
While the extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud rules has not yet caused 
significant clashes with other countries, some commentators fear that it is only a 
matter of time.118  
V.  STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE: PROSPECTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 
Given the recent increase in foreign-cubed claims in U.S. courts, and cases such 
as Morrison, the time is ripe to re-examine the conduct test and the problems it 
presents.  There is considerable fragmentation among courts on how to apply the 
conduct test to claims of transnational securities fraud, and courts have struggled to 
find the proper balance among the competing interests at issue.119  However, in spite 
of the imperfections of the current approach taken by courts to address the question 
of extraterritoriality, reform is a thorny issue.  Although broad assertions of 
extraterritoriality risk cause jurisdictional conflict and overregulation,120 too narrow 
of an approach to extraterritoriality will make it easier for opportunistic issuers to 
structure transactions specifically to avoid application of U.S. antifraud rules, and 
may result in under-regulation.   
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A.  A Market-Based Approach? 
To address the problems presented by transnational securities fraud, a number of 
commentators have suggested limiting the extraterritorial reach of securities laws.  
Apart from the bright-line rule urged by the defendants in Morrison, some legal 
scholars have argued that there should be an exchange-based choice-of-law rule.  In 
other words, if foreign investors transacted in foreign securities on a non-U.S. 
exchange, they would be barred from bringing a Rule 10b-5 claim in U.S. courts 
against the foreign issuer.121  This approach focuses on the effects of an alleged 
fraud, and would result in discarding the conduct test altogether.  It takes the view 
that governments should only be concerned about regulating conduct that has effects 
on persons within their jurisdiction.122  The best way to maximize global welfare, on 
this view, is to rely on the securities market to select the optimal level of 
regulation.123  
Thus, an exchange-based rule would provide a number of benefits.  First, it 
would provide issuers with valuable certainty as to the applicable law.  Such 
certainty would reduce the costs associated with offering securities and, therefore, 
allow the securities to be sold at a better price to investors.  Second, this approach 
would theoretically lead to a socially optimal level of regulation.124  If issuers choose 
to offer their securities on exchanges where investors perceive they would not 
receive adequate protection, investors will offer less for the securities than the issuer 
could obtain on an exchange associated with more investor-friendly rules.  
Conversely, under regimes where the marginal cost of additional regulations would 
outweigh the marginal benefits of the higher price investors might be willing to pay, 
issuers will not choose to sell there.125   
In the context of fraud in modern securities markets, there are three key problems 
with this approach. The first problem is that this approach ignores the 
interconnectedness of the financial markets and the resulting interest of governments 
in punishing fraud regardless of who is directly harmed.  Fraud in one place can have 
a chilling effect on markets worldwide, and even investors and markets not directly 
affected by a fraud can be harmed indirectly by fraudulent activity elsewhere.126  
This means that the U.S. and other countries have a strong interest in deterring fraud 
regardless of where the effects are felt.  Excluding foreign claimants from bringing 
securities fraud lawsuits in the United States or from participating in class actions in 
the United States undermines the deterrent effect of the private cause of action under 
                                                                 
121 Choi & Guzman, supra note 120, at 222.   
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Rule 10b-5.127  The benefits of the private cause of action, and the class action 
lawsuit in particular, are not available in most other countries that “lack private 
procedural instruments which can generate rigorous substantive control.”128  
A second problem with the market-based approach to fraud regulation is that it 
ignores other factors influencing the choice of law, or, as here, the selection of a 
market.  In practice there are many factors besides antifraud protections that dictate 
where people invest and where issuers choose to sell their securities, including tax 
considerations, expertise of regulators, reporting requirements, and even simple 
geography.  All other things being equal, the law and economics approach to 
antifraud regulation might be a good one, but unfortunately, all other things are not 
equal.129  Therefore, market selection may not lead to the optimal level of antifraud 
protection.  A market-based approach may in fact lead to a regulatory “race to the 
bottom.”130  Related to this is the law-and-economics assumption of the rational 
investor, which holds that investors price the potential for fraud into the securities 
they purchase.  An alternative model of investor behavior, the so-called “trusting 
investor” model,131 argues that investors “are willing to lose fair and square but not to 
be taken by fraud.”132  After they are defrauded, investors lose trust in securities 
markets, leading to price declines and potentially prolonging a bear market.133  While 
it is unclear which view of investor behavior more closely corresponds with reality, 
there is at least some evidence that a significant number of investors better fit the 
“trusting investor” model.134  This evidence against the rational investor model, 
combined with the potential for a regulatory race-to-the-bottom, cautions against 
letting the markets decide the appropriate level of antifraud regulation. 
Third, for the market-based approach to act as a stand-in for U.S. regulatory law 
when it comes to protecting defrauded U.S. investors, one must assume that all other 
countries with a stock exchange have an adequate antifraud enforcement regime.  
Such an assumption may be true with respect to some countries but certainly not all 
of them.  Even financially developed countries such as Germany have recently been 
reexamining their securities enforcement system following large corporate 
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scandals.135  The SEC has argued against such an approach, fearing it would let too 
much fraud slip through the cracks.136   
A modification of the exchange-based rule that potentially addresses the last of 
these problems, the one involving inadequate enforcement in other countries, has 
been proposed by Professors Choi and Silberman.137  They have argued for an 
exchange-based jurisdictional presumption, which would be rebuttable ex-ante by a 
determination by the SEC that certain countries lack effective antifraud rules and, 
therefore, U.S. law should be applied to claims of investors trading in those certain 
countries.138  This proposal is effectively a market-based approach, giving certainty 
as to the applicable law, at least for transactions taking place on a market that the 
SEC considers to be adequately regulated.  It would also address the third of the 
criticisms of a pure market-based approach outlined above, that some countries may 
not have an adequate antifraud enforcement regime.  As such, this market-based 
presumption approach would be a better solution than the pure exchange-based rule.  
However, it would not address the other two problems with an exchange-based rule 
discussed above.  In addition, the SEC “blacklist” contemplated by this proposal may 
be problematic, as it is unlikely in the current climate that the SEC would consider 
the antifraud enforcement systems of other countries up to par. 
A final point with regards to any proposed reform aimed at limiting 
extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud rules is that narrowing the extraterritorial 
scope of U.S. law would not address the problem of jurisdictional conflict caused by 
transnational securities fraud generally.  Although it would limit criticisms by other 
countries of the United States’ approach to extraterritorial application of its laws, the 
overall problem of a transaction being subject to multiple regulatory systems would 
not go away.139  Other actors around the world are catching on to the fact that there 
may be something to be gained in helping allegedly defrauded investors seek 
redress.140  Even if the U.S. cedes its position as the most plaintiff-friendly forum for 
adjudicating transnational securities fraud claims, it is only a matter of time before 
another country’s system steps in to fill that role.141 
While there is merit to the argument that the United States cannot police the 
world for securities fraud,142 there is a clear U.S. interest in allowing at least some 
foreign claimants to bring suit in U.S. courts and/or to participate in class actions.  
As one commentator points out, if multinational corporations believe they can 
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engage in fraud with little consequence over large portions of the globe, they will 
either:  
[a]dopt a two-tiered system, in which U.S. customers are treated 
differently from foreign customers, or corporations continue to injure both 
U.S. and foreign purchasers alike, calculating that profits gained from 
abroad more than make up for the court fees and damages that must be 
paid out to U.S. purchasers.143 
And, the United States has an interest in preventing both of these scenarios to protect 
its securities markets and investors.  The United States has long recognized that 
allowing fraudulent activity within its borders, even if the harm is only to foreigners, 
is contrary to its public policy.144 
B.  The Case for a Multilateral Resolution 
Another potential solution to the jurisdictional problems raised by transnational 
securities fraud would be a multilateral negotiated solution.145  As noted in a recent 
report by the International Bar Association (“IBA”), “[t]here is a profound consensus 
among regulators, academics, financial institutions and others that the regulatory 
framework of the international financial markets needs to undergo a fundamental 
change to address the diminished influence of national and regional securities 
regulators over cross-border financial activities.”146  This consensus applies to all 
areas of financial regulation.147  However, it is particularly present in the context of 
deterring and punishing securities fraud, which is necessary to maintain the stability 
and prosperity in the capital markets.   
Transnational securities fraud provides an ideal backdrop for international 
cooperation.  First of all, the problems caused by securities fraud—lack of investor 
confidence, reduced liquidity in the markets, and depressed prices—are no longer 
contained to one country or region but will affect capital markets throughout the 
world.148  Furthermore, most countries with a securities market have regulations 
aimed at discouraging financial fraud.149  While the prohibitions on fraud vary in 
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form, in substance they all aim to eradicate essentially the same behavior.150  
Similarly, all countries with an active securities market have an interest in reducing 
the inefficiencies created by overregulation and jurisdictional conflict.  In the wake 
of the recent financial crisis, there is an even greater consensus among countries that 
cooperation and reform are needed in the area of financial regulation.151 Therefore, 
the current climate presents a significant opportunity for the relevant actors to pursue 
a multilateral solution to the problems presented by transnational securities fraud. 
So far, the main efforts at cooperation and coordination in enforcing antifraud 
rules have focused on implementing minimum international standards and providing 
for cooperation in cross-border enforcement.152 The International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) has been working for some time on promoting 
cooperation among the world’s securities regulators to create guidelines and 
facilitate cross-border enforcement.153  However, IOSCO has had only limited 
success in furthering the much needed rapprochement between regulatory systems.154   
Over the years, IOSCO’s role has mainly consisted of information sharing and 
collecting, and making recommendations of non-binding guidelines for regulators.155  
In 2002, the organization adopted a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MMOU”) “designed to facilitate cross-border enforcement and exchange of 
information among the international community of securities regulators.”156  The 
MMOU sets forth a framework for information sharing between members, including 
the type of information obtainable, procedures for requesting such information, and 
authorized uses for the information.157 As of this writing, the MMOU has sixty-four 
signatories from among the world’s securities regulators, including the SEC and the 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission.158  However, the MMOU is non-
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binding, and significant legal barriers to its implementation still exist in many 
countries.159 In addition, while information sharing is helpful, it does not solve the 
problems that arise when multiple countries seek to apply their laws to the same 
activity.  Nor does it solve the problems of inadequate enforcement.  Recent IOSCO 
assessment reports have found that many countries “face significant challenges in 
implementing credible and effective enforcement programs.”160  Given the limited 
success of IOSCO and other voluntary efforts thus far, as well as the urgency of 
addressing the issues raised by transnational securities fraud, it is clear that another 
approach is in order. 
Recognizing that abolishing national regulations in favor of a comprehensive set 
of international regulations is neither very feasible nor the most favorable approach, 
the IBA Report calls for synchronization of existing national and regional 
regulations.161  Such synchronization can come about through convergence or 
standardization, exemption, or recognition.162  These approaches, or some 
combination thereof, are already being employed by some countries.  For example, 
harmonization of minimum standards in combination with mutual recognition lies at 
the heart of the European Union (“EU”) “passport” system of securities regulation 
between EU member states.163  Similarly, many countries are entering into mutual 
recognition agreements such as the U.S.-Australia Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to 
the Enforcement of Securities Laws (“U.S.-Australia MOU”).164  Some combination 
of these same approaches—harmonization, exemption, and recognition—could help 
resolve the problems raised by transnational securities fraud.   
Advocates of an exchange-based choice of law rule favor the market-based 
approach because it would avoid jurisdictional conflict and reduce costly 
inefficiencies.165  In a similar vein, the IBA urges governments to “agree upon a 
framework that provides for one jurisdiction to be the appropriate jurisdiction in 
which enforcement action will be taken in relation to any particular misconduct.”166  
The aim would be to create a form of cross-jurisdictional rule against double 
jeopardy,167 thus avoiding conflicts between jurisdictions who disagree as to the 
proper form or intensity of regulation of certain conduct, and limiting costs 
associated with the inefficiencies caused by overregulation.  However, rather than 
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U.S. courts adopting a unilateral exchange-based choice of law rule, a similar result 
could be achieved while still ensuring adequate protection of investors and the 
markets, through a multilateral mutual recognition system. 
First, some level of harmonization of the standard for what constitutes prohibited 
fraud may be necessary.  Then, countries could adopt a mutual recognition system 
similar to that in place between EU member states.  Mutual recognition essentially 
requires “that each country recognize the adequacy of the rules and regulations of 
another country,” thus permitting a regulated entity to do business in both 
jurisdictions.168  A similar multilateral agreement could be negotiated between a 
broader number of jurisdictions, under which the parties would recognize the 
adequacy of each other’s antifraud regimes.  Rather than simply providing minimum 
standards, such as the current IOSCO principles,169 the mutual recognition system 
would provide a stronger incentive for countries with inadequate enforcement 
systems to strengthen their regulatory regimes.  Some countries would undoubtedly 
need to update their antifraud rules or enforcement systems before other nations 
would be willing to admit them to the mutual recognition framework. Because of the 
obvious benefit to businesses of such an arrangement, national governments would 
have a strong incentive to ensure their regulatory systems were up to par and to 
undertake any necessary reforms.  IOSCO could perhaps serve as a central overseer 
of the system, ensuring that a country’s regulatory system met certain minimum 
standards in terms of substance and enforcement capability before it would be 
admitted to the mutual recognition agreement.  The arrangement should also include 
technical and capacity building assistance for emerging markets to strengthen their 
regulatory capability.170 
A choice-of-law framework would accompany the mutual recognition system for 
determining which nation’s law would apply to a particular transaction.  The 
framework would be applicable both in the context of a public enforcement action 
and in private lawsuits.  Determining the proper jurisdiction could be done in a 
number of ways.  The agreement could provide that the primary trading market of a 
company’s securities would be the proper jurisdiction.171  Alternatively, the 
jurisdiction of incorporation of the issuer could be the presumptive jurisdiction for 
enforcement.  There is some precedent on which to base such a jurisdictional 
arrangement.  For example, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has 
overseen the drafting of a number of conventions that are jurisdictional in nature.  
The far-reaching Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters is one such framework, though negotiations on this broad 
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agreement have stalled, and parties have struggled to reach consensus.172  Similarly, 
the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of 
Securities Held with an Intermediary could be used as a model for the jurisdictional 
agreement.173 
Of course, adopting a system such as the one outlined above would not be 
without difficulty.  Governments will undoubtedly be reluctant to participate in an 
agreement which they perceive as forcing them to cede regulatory authority over 
securities fraud activity.  To mitigate this concern, rather than creating a strict rule 
under which only one country would have jurisdiction over a particular instance of 
fraud, the agreement could perhaps contemplate a hierarchy of regulatory authority.  
Under such a hierarchy one state would have presumptive priority over particular 
conduct.  Further, under certain circumstances that would be enumerated in the 
agreement another country could, however, apply its law to the activity instead.  
Such an approach is not unprecedented in international law.  For example, under the 
UN Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
arguably one of the most successful international treaties dealing with jurisdictional 
considerations, authority to set aside an arbitral award is only granted to the courts of 
the country where the award was rendered, except in certain enumerated 
circumstances.174   
In addition to the standardization-and-mutual-recognition approach outlined 
above, bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements could be a complementary 
tool for furthering a multilateral solution to the problem of transnational securities 
fraud.  Cooperation agreements, including the U.S.-Australia MOU mentioned 
above, and others such as a Multilateral Memorandum on the Exchange of 
Information and on the Surveillance of Securities Activities between the members of 
the Forum of European Securities Commissions,175 are already in place.  Though, 
they vary in the level of cooperation promised and their enforceability.176  These 
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agreements help regulators to collect information they would not otherwise be able 
to obtain in some instances of transnational fraud, easing the way for enforcement. 
The multilateral solution proposed above is not the only way in which countries 
could work together to address the problems posed by the increasing instance of 
transnational securities fraud.  However, governments should prioritize international 
cooperation in this arena.  Recent events in the global financial markets, as well as 
contentious cases such as Morrison that raise important jurisdictional considerations 
in adjudicating transnational securities fraud claims, present an opportunity for 
catalyzing cooperation that should be seized.  Any multilateral solution should 
address both increased cooperation in terms of information sharing and enforcement, 
but negotiators should also consider a framework that would limit the instances 
where multiple nations would seek to regulate the same activity,177 while still 
ensuring that transnational frauds do not go unpunished. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Transnational securities fraud has increased the costs and complicated national 
securities regulator’s enforcement work.  It also creates potential for under-
enforcement, as no one country may have sufficient incentives to enforce its 
antifraud rules against an international violator.  This situation underscores the need 
for a private enforcement mechanism for investors to seek redress, preferably all 
together and in one forum in order to reduce inefficiencies.  Uncertainty as to the 
applicable law and potential overregulation when multiple jurisdictions seek to 
impose penalties for the same fraudulent activity cause costly inefficiencies in the 
market.  It is also unsustainable for the United States to act as the international 
policeman for securities fraud.  In addition, an overly broad extraterritorial 
application of national regulatory law may cause jurisdictional conflict with other 
countries.  A market-based rule or presumption, as suggested by some 
commentators, would help resolve the problems of overregulation and jurisdictional 
conflict.   However, such a rule could result in under-regulation, which comes with 
its own costs in terms of reduced investor confidence in the markets.  Ideally, a 
multilateral solution  should be negotiated that would encourage countries to meet 
certain minimum standards in terms of substance and enforcement of securities 
antifraud rules, while at the same time providing a jurisdictional or choice-of-law 
agreement to determine a primary enforcement jurisdiction. 
The Morrison case has drawn renewed attention to the U.S. courts’ approach to 
dealing with transnational securities fraud, and underscores the need for reform.178  
The dispute on the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities antifraud rules 
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among courts, academics, and other actors should motivate the U.S. government to 
initiate multilateral discussion of the issue.  Though, a multilateral negotiated 
solution will take some time to achieve.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the 
Morrison case.179 As this author expected, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second 
Circuit’s decision.180  The Supreme Court grounded its decision on the fact that the 
§10(b) did not apply extraterritorily and thus only applied to securities on domestic 
exchanges.181  Accordingly, there was no claim as the securities involved were no 
listed on a domestic exchange.182  As discussed in Part I(b) supra, the private 
enforcement mechanism in the United States is important to ensuring the securities 
laws are adequately enforced.183  In addition, there are a number of other 
considerations that weigh in favor of preserving a flexible approach to the question 
of extraterritorial application of the antifraud rules. 
Some commentators have argued that courts should adopt a presumption in favor 
of extraterritoriality, urging that “reasonable” extraterritorial assertions of U.S. 
regulatory law will encourage international cooperation and lead to more bilateral 
and multilateral agreements to resolve conflicts and improve global regulation.184  It 
is difficult to prove that U.S. courts’ approach to the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. securities laws has caused the movement towards increased bilateral 
cooperation.  However, it is clear that bilateral cooperation has not been stunted.  
There has also been greater multilateral cooperation in recent years, for example, in 
the form of the multilateral memorandum of understanding adopted by the 
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Protection Bill of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009). 
183 See Isaacharoff, supra note 21. 
184 Weintraub, supra note 45, at 1817. Reasonable extraterritorial assertions include 
application of U.S. laws to conduct causing harm abroad, in the context of securities fraud, 
and also to conduct abroad that has “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects” in 
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International Organization of Securities Commissions in 2002.185  Such activity has 
coincided with the increasing internationalization of the world’s financial markets as 
well as increased incidence of securities fraud claims in U.S. courts by foreign 
plaintiffs. 
A presumption in favor of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud rules, 
of course, is victim to the various criticisms that have been made by proponents of a 
market-based rule.  It is more likely to lead to overregulation, thus creating economic 
inefficiencies.  In addition, broader extraterritorial application will more likely lead 
to jurisdictional conflict.  However, the criticisms of this approach may be 
outweighed by its benefits.  There is little evidence that fear of extraterritorial 
assertions of the antifraud rules have caused foreign companies to avoid conducting 
business in the United States.186  Although U.S. equity markets may no longer be the 
markets of choice for the world’s corporations, there are many factors that have 
contributed to this, and the blame cannot all be laid on overregulation or shareholder 
lawsuits.187 
Further, the problem of jurisdictional conflict is less acute in the realm of 
securities law than in other areas such as antitrust.188 As noted above, securities fraud 
is almost universally prohibited.  The substance of the law is also fairly similar 
across the world.189  While procedural and enforcement mechanisms differ, private 
enforcement in general is becoming more universally accepted.  For example, China 
has recently opened the way for civil disputes relating to securities fraud.190  Even the 
French government has recently stated that it is not opposed to the idea of class 
actions cases in France for investor redress, though no reform to this effect has yet 
made much headway.191  All this signals increasing acceptance of the U.S. approach 
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org/about/index.cfm?section=history (last visited April 27, 2010).  
186 For a contrary view, see Comm. on Capital Markets Regulation, supra note 112. 
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Cardozo School of Law, Working Paper No. 176, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=951705. Factors that have arguably had a greater effect on decreased activity by 
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that foreign companies can access U.S. investors without registering in the United States, 
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188 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 416 (1987).  This may be in part 
because of the treble damages penalties available in private litigation of antitrust violations. In 
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189 Compare 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2009) with Trade Practices Act. 1974, c 52 (Austl.) 
(prohibiting a corporation from engaging in conduct in trade or commerce that “is misleading 
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Example of France, Jones Day, Internal Publication (Oct. 2009), http://www.jonesday.com/ 
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Attachment/6e60f00f-0d2a-4c0c-b986-d7982522c1f6/Class%20Actions%202009.pdf. 
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to enforcement of its securities laws.  It may even open the way for competition 
between jurisdictions for private regulatory claims.192 
In sum, as private enforcement catches on, and regulators around the world 
recognize the need for greater cooperation and improved enforcement of securities 
antifraud rules, the time is ripe for governments and other interested parties to begin 
work on a multilateral negotiated solution to the problems presented by transnational 
securities fraud.  In the meantime, U.S. courts should be careful to preserve a flexible 
approach to the question of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud rules, 
while still screening out claims by foreign plaintiffs that are not based on sufficient 
conduct within the United States.  More aggressive use of discretionary dismissals on 
the base of international comity or forum non conveniens may be useful in this 
regard.193 
 
                                                                 
192 Buxbaum, Competition, supra note 9, at 7-8. 
193 Cf. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 64-65. 
